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of only 150 shares of the corporation here involved and Reed
was the legal owner of 245 shares ( 41 Cal.2d 17) . By virtue
of this situation Norman now contends that Reed could have
assumed control of the corporation and has no right to bring
a derivative action (see Jones v. Re-lJiine Oil Co., 47 Cal.App.
2d 832 [119 P.2d 219)) but this contention may not now be
considered as it does not appear that plaintiff has assumed
control of the corporation and he alleges that the defendants
have control of all the books and records of the corporation.
Although he may own the majority of the stock by reason of
the holding above mentioned, he has alleged and maintained
throughout this litigation that Norman has assumed complete
control and management of the business of the corporation
to the exclusion of plaintiff. That is a matter that should be
addressed to the trial court; it may not appropriately be
considered on a motion to dismiss the appeal.
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5939. In Bank. .Apr.12, 1957.]
THE PEOPLE Respondent, v. DAVID J. HARDENBROOK, Appellant.
[1] Witnesses- Corroboration- Prior Consistent Statements.Where the opposition has assailed the testimony of a witness
as being of recent fabrication, an exception to the hearsay rule
allows the admission of evidence of statements or conduct
prior to the claimed fabrication and consistent with the testimony of the witness at the trial, not to prove the facts of the
case, but as tending to show that the witness has not been
[1] .Admissibility for purpose of supporting impeached witness,
of prior statements by him consistent with his testimony, note, 140
A.L.R. 21. See also Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 153; Am.Jur., Witnesses,
§ 817 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Witnesses, § 280; [3] Homicide,
§58; [4] Homicide, §62; [5] Criminal Law, §1404(14); [6] Criminal Law, § 1407(6); [7] Criminal Law, § 1404(12); [8] Criminal
Law, § 1404(13); [9] Criminal Law, § 1092.
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controlled by motives of interest and that he has not fabricated something for the purpose of the case.
[2] !d.-Corroboration-Prior Consistent Statements.-In a prosecution for first degree murder of defendant's mother, it was
not error to permit a person to testify that a witness had
told him, on the night preceding the crime, he had overheard
a conversation between defendant and another named person
as to the "planning" of killing "someone's mother," where the
jury was clearly informed that such testimony was admitted
only for the limited purpose of showing that prior to commission of the offense the wibH'ss, whose word was contradicted,
made a statement as to the conversation to third parties and
therefore it could indicate that he didn't fabricate the story
after commission of the offense.
[3] Homicide-Evidence-Premeditation.-In a prosecution for
first degree murder of defendant's mother, it was not error to
exclude the testimony of a "foster-aunt" (sister of the victim)
to the effect that defendant was incapable of premeditation,
the witness not being an expert.
[4] !d.-Evidence-Prior Conduct of Defendant.-In a prosecution
for first degree murder of defendant's mother, it was not error
to refuse to permit a "foster-aunt" to testify concerning defendant's conduct more than seven years prior to the time of
trial, since such testimony would he too remote in point of
time to have been of much aiel to the jury.
[5] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder of
defendant's adoptive mother, the district attomey did not commit prejudicial error during his argument to the jury in referring to defendant as a "mother-killer" and "sneaky" motherkiller, in referring to the victim as defendant's "mother",
whereas she was only his "foster-mother," and in referring to
defendant as never working and having no money and being
"no good," where the evidence showed that defendant considered his victim as his mother, that she acted toward him
as if he were her natural son from the time he was 2 months
of age, that he admitted having killed his "mother," that he
had no money with the exception of perhaps a dollar on the
night before he committed the crime, and that he had worked
once in a while but not at one job for any length of time.
[6] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting Attorney.~ ~Tn a proseeution for first degrep murder of defend;lut's moth<'r, no prejudice resnltPd from the district attorney's
argument to tlw jury eow·Prniug murdPr perpetrated in the
Nllllllli~sion of n l'(,blwry and by lying in wait, whPrF the court
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 193, 205; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§ 321.
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refused an instruction on
and no instruction
was
on the theory that murder committed
a robbrrv >~'as first
murdPr other tlum
mrre stntemcnt to
that effect, where the jury was .fully and .fairly instructed
concerning both tirst and second d<>grPe murder, as well as
manslaughter, and was admonished that its duty was to follow
the law as Htated to it by the court, and where the jury was
also told that it was to be governed solely by evidence introduced at the trial, that any instruction inapplicable to the
facts found by it was to be disregarded, and that any statements made by counsel were not to be taken as evidence in the
case.
[7] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error--Argument of Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder the People
did not commit error in arguing to the jury that they need not
all agree on the same theory of first degree murder if they
agreed that defendant was guilty of first degree murder.
[8] Id.-Appeal-Ha.rmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting Attorney.-A conviction of first degree murder of defendant's
mother should not be reversed because the People argued to
the jury that a witness had testified to seeing a gun in
defendant's possession on two diffenmt oeeasions prior to
commission of the crime, though the witness aetna lly testified
to only seeing the gun once, whcrP in vi<'W of thP evidence
and the other correct referencrs hy the prosecution to the
witness' testimony no prejudiee resulted to drfendant from
what was obviously a slip of the tongue, and where the jury
was instrueted that statements and argument of counsel were
not evidence in the ease and, if contrary to thr evidrnre, should
he disregarded.
[9] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Argument of CounseL-If defendant
demns that any harmful effect might result from a statement
of the prosecution during argument to the jury, he should
make timely objection at the trial so that any misunderstanding
could be clarified hy a proper instruction.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County.
h ,J. Mouser, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgmrnt of convirtion imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
Hussell Yeager, Public Defender (Imperial County), for
Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and "'William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Hespondent.
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CARTER, ,J.-This is an automatic appeal from a judgment
imposing the death penalty after a jury verdict finding the
defendant guilty of first degree murder and fixing the penalty
as death. Defendant was found sane by a jury after trial
on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The record
does not disclose that a motion for a new trial was made by or
on behalf of defendant.
Defendant, David J. Hardenbrook, was the adopted son
of the victim of the homicide, Mrs. Eleanor Hardenbrook.
Defendant admitted both prior to and during the trial that
he shot his adoptive mother through the back of the head
while he was visiting her at her home on Saturday, March
17, 1956. The major question involved concerns the degree
of the crime-whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding of murder in the first degree or whether it shows only
second degree homicide. The admissibility of certain evidence
from which the jury could have inferred that the crime was
premeditated is questioned as being erroneous and prejudicial.
On Thursday, March 15, 1956, defendant borrowed a .22
caliber automatic pistol with the avowed purpose of using it
for target practice. Scott, a witness for the People, testified
that he saw the defendant on the night of March 15th, at
the Tropics Bar and Cafe in Imperial at about 8 o'clock in
the evening and that defendant was showing a .22 automatic
pistol to some people sitting at the bar and that defendant
said the gun was his. Scott testified that he, the defendant
and three other persons left the cafe and bar after about an
hour and went to Brawley; that defendant wanted to stop at
his mother's house; that they stopped and defendant went in,
had something to eat, came back out and they all proceeded to
another bar just outside of Brawley. During this time the
gun was in the back of Scott's car. After going to another
bar Scott drove defendant back to the El Centro Hotel where
he was living; defendant was "pretty sickening drunk" and
left the gun in Scott's car.
On Friday, March 16th, Scott saw defendant leaving the
Post parking lot on the outside of the naval air station base
and stopped his car so that defendant could get in. Scott and
defendant then drove to El Centro where Scott bought some
bullets for the gun so that they could do some target practicing. They drove towards Imperial and then to a place
called New River where they did some target shooting. Out
of a box of 50 shells, nine were left and defendant wanted to
save them. During the target shooting defendant asked Scott
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if he knew where a silencer could be bought and what it would
cost. On their way back defendant said someone at the gate
wanted a ride back into town and when they came back out
again they picked up the hitchhiker, Potter, and went into
town. At this time it was about dusk and around 7 o'clock.
When defendant got out of the car at El Centro he took the
gun out of the glove compartment and got a paper bag into
which to put it. During the ride into El Centro the matter
of a silencer was again discussed.
Potter, who was sitting in the back of the car during the
ride into El Centro, testified that Scott, who was driving,
looked "over to Hardenbrook and he said, 'Where are you
going to kill your mother~' So Hardenbrook looked over at
Scott and he says, 'In the bedroom, I guess.' They got to
talking about how much a silencer cost, or where he could
get one, and Scott said he didn't have any idea what they
cost or where to get one.'' Potter testified that later that
night when he got back to the base he stopped over where he
worked and told the story to a "guy named Hum." This
portion of Potter's testimony was denied by both defendant
and Scott.
Defendant testified that he had been adopted by the deceased when he was about 2 months old; that he had lived
with her up until "fairly recently" when he had moved to the
El Centro Hotel where he lived alone. He testified to borrowing the gun and showing it to several people at the Tropics
bar; to the target shooting and to discussing the matter of a
silencer for the gun but said that he asked about it just out
of curiosity. He told how he and Scott picked up Potter and
gave him a ride into town. He testified that after he got
out of the car with the gun he went into a grocery store and
got a paper bag in which to carry the gun; that he then went
back to the El Centro Hotel and "put up the gun" and
hitchhiked from there to Brawley and went to his mother's
home where he had dinner with her after which they listened
to the radio and played canasta; that he then hitchhiked back
to El Centro to his hotel. He said he did not take the gun
with him on Friday night when he went to his mother's
home. He testified that his mother told him that if he would
come back in the morning she would launder his clothes for
him; that he got up around 9 :30 on the morning of Saturday,
the 17th, and hitchhiked from El Centro to Brawley taking
the laundry and the gun with him. He said that he took the
gun with him so that he could clean it before returning it;
that when he arrived at his mother's home he put the alumi-
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num box containing his clothes and the gun on a table; that
he waited until his mother was out of the room and then took
the gun out of the box and put it between two pillows on the
couch becanse his "mother doesn't approve of firearms of any
type." After hiding t be gun, defendant testified that he ate
breakfast and sat around looking at books and listening to
the Metropolitan opera on the radio and that ''after my
clothes had gone through the laundry, she brought them back
in and ~was starching them, and I went over to the conch and
reached under the pillow and got the gun and >vent back to
the ehair and shot her" in the back of the neek; that he didn't
know why he did it; tl1at "it just happened"; that he hadn't
thought about killing his mother; that they had not had any
harsh words at any time; that vvhen he saw his mother fall
down he realized what he had done; that he dragged the body
from the kitchen to the bedroom. After that he testifiE'd that
he tried to forge his mother's name to a eheck but was so
nervous he spoiled the first one, bnt then wrote one for $75
payable to himself by forging his mother's name; that he
took two of her small suitcases and her car keys from her
bedroom dresser; went out and got his mother's ear and drove
to Brawley and eashed the chedc; that he then had gas put in
the car and drove ont to the base where he talked with Scott;
that he then drove out to Seal Beach where he stayed overnight vvith some friends; that he and the friends went to the
beach the next day; that he drove them to their home and
went to a motel where he stayed overnight; that the next
morning after reading about the crime in a newspaper, he
went to a priest and confessed what he had done; that the
priest called the pollee. On eross-examination defendant admitted that he had given his mother a great deal of trouble
over money and the car and that she had suggested that he
mow~ out of her horne and ''go out on my own.'' Mrs. Hardenbrook's body was found by her landlord on March 18th.
Over objection by defense counsel, Patrick Hum testified
that Potter had told him on the night of the 16th of the eonwrsation he hacl overheard behYeen Scott and the defendant
as to the "planning" of killing "someone's mother." At the
time the ronrt a(1mittrd this testimony, thP jury was admonishe<l as follows: "TJallies all(l )!Plltl<'!lH'Il of tlw jury, I wish
io advise yon at this time in r.•f<'l'Pll!'l' to that -this answer
by the witness is being· adtnittl·d for· a lilllit<•d put·pose only.
As yon know, testimony has hePn given here by one of the
witnesses that \vhen hr was in the ear with the defendant.
thE're was certain eonversation in regard to the shooting of
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one mother. 'fhe defendant, when he took the
stated
there was no such ('OnYenmtiou. Now, then thi~ answer J'i
being a llo·wed to go i11 not for i lie purpose of
the
truth of that eonvcrsatioll, but to prove, if it proves to you,
for your consideration, to show that at the time prior to the
(·onunission of the offense that the witness whose word was
()OJJtradieted, made a statement as to the eouversation to third
pat'ties and therefore it could indicate he didn't fabricate
the story after the commission of the offense. Now, do you
know what I mean 1" The record shows that the jury indicated its understanding in the affirmative.
It is contended by defendant that the i rial conrt committed
prejudicial error in permitting the witness Hum to testify
concerning the conversation Potter had repeatefl to him on
the night prior to the commission of the crime. [1] "It is
the rule generally and in this state that where the opposition
has assailed the testimony of a witness as being of recent
fabrication, an exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of evidence of statements or conduct prior to the claimed
fabrication and consistent with the testimony of the witness
at the trial, 'not to prove the facts of the case, but as tending
to show that the witness has not been controlled by motives
of interest and that he has not fabrieated something for the
purpose of the case.' (People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 753754 [104 P.2d 7941; see also Swenzey v. Valley Transport,
Inc., 6 Wn.2d 324 [106 P.2fl 567, 111 P.2d 1010, 140 .A.L.R.
1]; 140 .A.L.R. 93.)" (People v. Walsh, 47 Cal.2d 36,41
[301 P.2d 247] .) [2] It is apparent that the court did not
err in permitting the witness Hum to testify since the jury
was clearly informed that snch testimony was admitted only
for the limited purpose set forth in the decided cases as an
exception to the hearsay rule. (See alRo People v. Doetsch man,
69 Cal.App.2d 486, 491-492 [159 P.2fl 418] ; B£ckforcl v.
Mause1·, 53 Cal.App.2d 680, 686-687 [ 128 P.2<1 79] ; Davis v.
Tannet·, 88 Cal.App. 67, 76-77 [262 P. 1106] .)
[3] Defendant contendR that the trial eourt eommitted
prejudicial error in refnsing to permit him to offer testimony
of a "foster-aunt" (siRter of the vietim) to the effect that he
was ineapable of premeditation. '!'he eonrt ruled that the
witness could testify to '' eertain faets in eonnection with
eertain thillgR that haYe happened in the past for the limited
purpose of the jury considering such eYidence for whatever
YahH' it may have, if any, in considering whether this individual has the power of mind to premeditate" but that not being
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an expert the witness could not testify as to any opinion held
by her as to defendant's ability to premeditate nor could she
testify to aets and occurrences occurring during the time
before defendant \Yas 14 years of age. (It was admitted by
counsel that at the time of the crime defendant was 20 years
of age and that at the time of trial he was 21 years of age.)
After the court's ruling, defense counsel said : ''I am sorry
for taking so much time, we might as well forget about it.
It is too general under your ruling, Judge." No effort was
made by defendant to call the witness for testimony concerning
conduct on the part of defendant during the seven years
preceding the trial. Under the circumstances shown by the
record it appears that the court did not err in excluding
opinion evidence given by a lay person. In People v. Wells,
33 Cal.2d 330, 345 [202 P.2d 53], medical evidence of the
defendant's state of mind was held to have been improperly
excluded at the trial of the general issue. In the case at bar,
the defense offered no medical testimony concerning the
defendant's ability to form an intent to commit a crime although the defendant was permitted to testify that he usually
acted on "impulse" and that he had spent some time in
Camarillo State Hospital. [4] There also appears to have
been no error in the trial court's refusal to permit the lay
witness to testify concerning defendant's conduct more than
seven years prior to the time of trial since such testimony
would be too remote in point of time to be of much aid to the
Jury.
[5] The defendant contends that the district attorney committed prejudicial error in numerous instances during his
argument to the jury. It is argued that the district attorney's
references to the defendant as a "mother-killer" and
"sneaky" mother-killer were intended to instill passion and
prejudice against the defendant in the minds of the jurors ;
that the reference to the victim as the "mother" of the
defendant had no basis in the record in that she was only his
"foster-mother." It is also argued that the district attorney's
references to defendant as never working and having no money
and as being "no good" had no foundation in the record.
Insofar as the references to the deceased as the defendant's
mother are concerned, the record shows that the defendant
considered her his mother and that she had acted toward him
as if he were her natural son from the time he was 2 months
of age. The record also shows that defendant at all times
admitted having killed his "mother." The record shows that
defendant had no money with the exception of perhaps a
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dollar on the night before he committed the crime; that he
had worked once in a while but not at one job for any length
of time. 'l'hese arguments therefore appear to be without
merit.
(6] Error is also predicated on the district attorney's
argument to the jury concerning murder perpetrated in the
commission of a robbery and by lying in wait. The record
shows that the district attorney argued that the murder was
of the first degree in that it was premeditated on the part of
the defendant, or committed by him when lying in wait, or in
the course of a robbery. The trial court refused an instruction
on "lying-in-wait" and no instruction was given on the theory
that murder committed during a robbery was first degree
murder other than a mere statement to that effect. The jury
was fully and fairly instructed concerning both murder of
the first and second degree, as well as manslaughter, and the
jury was admonished that its duty was to follow the law as
stated to it by the court. The jury was also told that it was
to be governed solely by the evidence introduced at the trial
"and the law as stated to you by me"; that any instruction
inapplicable to the facts as found by it was to be disregarded;
that any statements made by counsel were not to be taken as
evidence in the case. Under the circumstances it would appear
that defendant suffered no prejudice from the remarks of
the prosecution in its arguments when the evidence concerning
defendant's conduct in his mother's home was commented
upon as well as the comments upon the evidence as it related
to defendant's taking of the deceased's car and traveling bags.
These facts were in evidence and any comments by the prosecution concerning theories of the law inapplicable thereto
could not have been considered by the jury in view of the
admonition of the trial judge since it must be presumed that
the jury followed the law as given to it by the court.
[7] Defendant argues that the People committed prejudicial error in arguing to the jury that they need not all agree
on the same theory of first degree murder if they agreed
that defendant was guilty of first degree murder. In People v.
Chavez, 37 Cal.2d 656, 671, 672 [234 P.2d 632], where the
same question was first raised in this court, we held '' '. . .
It was not necessary to require the jury to agree upon the
theory. If, under any one of the theories set forth, they
believed appellant had gained possession of and appropriated
to his own use the moneys of Pacific, he was guilty of grand
theft.' [Quotation from People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal.App.2d
48 C.2d-12
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256 [130 P.2(l495].] The same rule is applieable to
the various grounds upon which the jnry could have found
Ch:we?: guilty of murrler in the first rlegree."
[8] Defendant also eoni ends that the People committed
prejudicial error in that the evidence was misquoted. It is
argued that the prosecuting attorney argued to the jury that a
witness, Heise, had testified to seeing the gun in defendant's
possession on two different occasions prior to the commission
of the crime. Defendant's argument is that the witness Heise
saw the gun only once on the Thursday preceding the homicide. The record shows that Heise testified that he saw the
gun on Thursday at the \Vaikiki Bar and that it was in a box
inside a paper bag and that it was unloaded. He also testified
that he saw defendant the following evening at the \Vaikiki
again and that he had the same paper sack with him; that
the witness asked defendant if he were still carrying "that"
around with him and that defendant said "yes"; that defendant, on the second occasion, showed him the clip he had for
the gun and that it had shells in it. 'l'he prosecuting attorney
pointed out to the jury that on the second occasion Heise
didn't see the gun but that he did see the paper bag and the
clip with the shells in it. In his closing argument the prosecuting attorney argued to the jury that Heise saw the gun
twice-once on Friday night. No obj(•ction was interposed by
defense counsel and, in view of the evidence and the other
correct references by the proseeution to the testimony of
Heise it is difficult to see how any prejudice could have resulted to defendant from what was obviously a slip of the
tongue. Further, the jury was instructed that the statements
and arguments of counsel were not evidence in the ease and,
if contrary to the evidence, should be disregarded.
A reading of the prosecution's arguments to the jury disproves defendant's contention that an appeal was made to
the jury in order to arouse passion and prejudice against the
defendant, and that the prosecution argued its personal belief
as to defendant's guilt. The remarks made did not exceed the
bounds of fair comment on the evidence and the so-called
"personal belief" remarks were pleas to the jury to bring in a
first degree verdict. [9] It shonld also be noted that defense
counsel made no objer.tion during the arguments. "If appellant deemed that any harmful effect might attach to the statement in question, he should have made timely objection at the
trial so that any misunderstanding could have been clarified
by a proper instruction to the jury." (People v. Amaya,
40 Cal.2d 70, 79 [251 P.2d 324] .)
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There was substantial evidence in support of the jury's
rletermination and its finding will not be disturbed. (People v.
Smith, 15 Cal.2d 640, 648 [104 P.2d 510]; People v. Amaya,
40 Cal.2d 70, 81 [251 P.2d 324] .)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 6788.

In Bank.

Apr.19, 1957.]

STATE Ol;~ CALIFORNIA, SUBSEQUENT INJURIES
.B'UND, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and GUS'l' ERICKSON et al., Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Law Governing.-Since an industrial injury is the basis for any compensation award, the law
in force at the time of the injury is to be taken as the measure
of the injured person's right of recovery.
[2] Statutes-Prospective and Retrospective Operation.-Statutes
are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly
made to appear that such was the legislative intent.
[3] !d.-Prospective and Retrospective Operation.-Legislative intent in favor of the retrospective operation of a statute cannot be implied from the mere fact that the statute is remedial
and subject to the rules of liberal interpretation.
[4a, 4b] Workmen's Compensation - Insurance and Insurance
Funds- Retrospective Operation of Statutes.- Lab. Code,
§ 5500.5, providing for reimbursement from the Subsequent
Injuries Fund by means of "an award in favor of the employer"
who has paid the original award to an employe suffering
silicosis resulting from underground metal mining operations
where other employers who have not contributed to such payment are beyond the commission's jurisdiction, dead, insolvent,
or not subject to enforcement of the award, but not declaring
that such reimbursement provisions shall be given retrospective
operation, should not be retrospectively applied where the injury occurred prior to the effective date of such code section.
[5] !d.-Insurance and Insurance Funds-Retrospective Operation
of Statutes.---'l'hongh payments from the SubsPquent Injuries

[ 1] SteP Cal.Jur., Workmren's Compensation, § 7; Am.Jur., Work.
lllten's CompPnsation, § 32.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 10; [2, 3~
Statutes, § 24; [ 4-8] Workmen's Compensation, § 244.

